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NOTES 
BREAKING BAD SCIENCE: DUE PROCESS 
AS A VEHICLE FOR POSTCONVICTION 
RELIEF WHEN CONVICTIONS ARE BASED 
ON UNRELIABLE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
VINCENT P. IANNECE† 
Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the 
phrase “due process of law,” there can be no doubt that it 
embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with 
opportunity to be heard.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Picture this:  A family man living with his wife, his two 
young stepsons, and his six-month-old baby.  While he was 
putting away groceries, his stepsons went to the shed to play.  
Minutes later, his neighbors alerted him that smoke was pouring 
out of the shed and quickly turning to flames which consumed 
the structure, killing both of his stepsons.  Fire department 
incendiary scientists indicated that the physical clues and the 
results of scientific testing of the pour patterns undoubtedly 
pointed to arson.  That was all it took to successfully prosecute 
this father and send him to prison for the rest of his life.  His 
only son was forced to grow up with the harsh reality that his 
father is a murderer.  Twenty-five years later, the field of fire 
investigation advanced considerably and the evidence that was 
instrumental in his conviction is now known to be fundamentally 
unreliable.  Experts reviewing his case found the pour and burn 
patterns were simply evidence that the shed was subjected to 
intense fire, and the toxicology report of the boys proved that the  
 
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2015, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2012, University of Pittsburgh. 
1 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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fire was not started with gasoline as the medical examiner had 
testified.  Based on the current split of authority in federal circuit 
courts, there is a possibility that this case may never be retried.2 
Over the last fifty years, science has become crucial to the 
investigation and prosecution of crime.3  Increasingly, the 
solution of major crimes will turn on “the discovery at crime 
scenes and subsequent scientific laboratory analysis of latent 
fingerprints, weapons, footprints, hairs, fibers, blood, and similar 
traces.”4  Such evidence can be admitted to satisfy the State’s 
burden as to a particular element of a charge, to establish that 
the defendant—and not some other individual—committed an 
alleged crime or to prove that a crime has occurred.  Proof of the 
growing reliance on scientific evidence is exhibited by how 
noteworthy its nonexistence has become.5 
Regrettably, unreliable expert forensic science testimony has 
been introduced into evidence and innocent people have been 
wrongfully convicted due, at least in part, to its admission, 
despite the Supreme Court’s requirement that only reliable 
expert testimony be admitted.6  For many traditional types of 
forensic science, “experts’ claims about their field, the authority 
of their methodologies, and their own abilities have dramatically 
outstripped what has actually been established by persuasive 
 
2 This hypothetical is based on the conviction of Ed Graf. Dave Mann, The Arson 
Files: After Serving 25 Years, Ed Graf May Finally Receive New Trial, OBSERVER, 
Jan. 17, 2013, http://www.texasobserver.org/the-arson-files-after-serving-25-years-
ed-graf-may-finally-receive-new-trial/. 
3 Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of 
Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2013); see also 
Paul C. Giannelli, The Twenty-First Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Scientific 
Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions, 137 MIL. L. REV. 167, 167 (1992) (“Scientific and 
expert evidence is playing an ever-increasing and far more important role in 
criminal prosecutions than in the past.”). 
4 Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic Science: 
Progress amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 624 (2007) (footnote omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
5 Giannelli, supra note 3, at 169; see Rorie Sherman, Technology, Emotion Key 
in Jogger Case, 12 NAT’L L.J. 12 (1990) (“Among the defense’s strongest points in 
attacking the prosecution’s case was the surprising absence of physical 
evidence . . . .”). 
6 Jane Campbell Moriarty, "Misconvictions," Science, and the Ministers of 
Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2007); see Mark Hansen, Crimes in the Lab, A.B.A. 
J., Sept. 2013, at 47 (noting that forensic lab scandals “have the potential to put 
innocent people behind bars—or worse—and spawn litigation that could end up 
costing taxpayers dearly”). 
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research and careful study.”7  Forensic scientists frequently 
testify in court to matters that are not as recognized or as certain 
as they assert.8  These experts have exaggerated their level of 
knowledge, underreported the probabilities of error, and 
intimated greater confidence than is deserved.9  Too many 
experts in the criminal justice system manifest a police-
prosecution bias—a willingness to shade or distort opinions to 
support the State’s claim—and too many prosecutors seek out 
these experts.10  Furthermore, there has been far too little study 
of how frequently forensic scientists make mistakes and when or 
why these potential errors are more likely to occur.11  If 
evidentiary inputs into our criminal justice system cannot be 
trusted, neither should the outputs.12  Recent research suggests 
that misleading and erroneous forensic science has been a 
significant contributing factor in many wrongful convictions.13 
In recent years, both the scientific community and state and 
federal courts have increasingly acknowledged that flawed 
forensic science is seriously affecting the integrity of our criminal 
justice system.14  One of the most serious problems with forensic 
science is that it is not unusual for forensic disciplines, once 
considered reliable and routinely introduced at criminal trials, to 
be partially or wholly discredited after more thorough scientific 
evaluation is conducted.  For example, courts once credited and 
 
7 Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science, 
75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 1209–10 (2010); see Hansen, supra note 6, at 46 (describing 
that a review of a Minnesota crime lab “identified major flaws in nearly every aspect 
of the lab’s operation, including dirty equipment, a lack of standard operating 
procedures, faulty testing techniques, illegible reports, and a woeful ignorance of 
basic scientific principles”). 
8 Mnookin, supra note 7, at 1210. 
9 Id. 
10 Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The 
Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439, 441 (1997); 
see Hansen, supra note 6, at 49–50 (describing an investigation that revealed 
overwhelming evidence of pro-prosecution bias at a crime lab). 
11 Mnookin, supra note 7, at 1210. 
12 Id. at 1210–11. 
13 See Hansen, supra note 6, at 47 (“[S]tudies show that unverified or improper 
forensic science (defined as fraud, misconduct or the use of scientifically untested 
evidence) played a role in about 55 percent of [DNA exonerations].”). See generally 
Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
14 See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) (cautioning that 
“[s]erious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal 
trials”). 
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accepted such forensic techniques as hair microscopy,15 
handwriting analysis,16 bite-mark comparisons,17 and 
comparative bullet lead analysis.18  These techniques are now 
widely considered to be unreliable and no longer accepted by 
some courts.19  Judge Cochran described this problem as a 
“fundamental disconnect between the worlds of science and of 
law” and opined: 
This disconnect between changing science and reliable verdicts 
that can stand the test of time has grown in recent years as the 
speed with which new science and revised scientific 
methodologies debunk what had formerly been thought of as 
reliable forensic science has increased.  The potential problem of 
relying on today’s science in a criminal trial (especially to 
determine an essential element such as criminal causation or 
the identity of the perpetrator) is that tomorrow’s science 
sometimes changes and, based upon that changed science, the 
former verdict may look inaccurate, if not downright ludicrous.  
But the convicted person is still imprisoned. . . . [f]inality of 
judgment is essential in criminal cases, but so is accuracy of the 
result—an accurate result that will stand the test of time and 
changes in scientific knowledge.20 
Compounding this problem is the fact that scientific evidence 
has a uniquely persuasive impact on juries.  In Reed v. State, the 
court proclaimed that “[l]ay jurors tend to give considerable 
 
15 See, e.g., Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1557–58 (E.D. Okla. 
1995) (reversing a defendant’s death sentence and finding, in part, that admission of 
“expert hair testimony at [appellant’s] trial was irrelevant, imprecise and 
speculative, and its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect”). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) 
(excluding handwriting expert’s testimony for lack of reliability, noting that “[i]f 
courts allow the admission of long-relied upon but ultimately unproven analysis, 
they may unwittingly perpetuate and legitimate junk science”). 
17 See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 852, 880 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (holding 
that the decision to admit expert testimony that the defendant was the only possible 
perpetrator in the Detroit metropolitan area, because of a bite mark on the murder 
victim’s cheek, deprived the defendant of a fair trial in violation of her due process 
rights, where such evidence was the only physical evidence linking the defendant to 
the crime, and the testimony was unreliable and grossly misleading). 
18 See, e.g., Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006) 
(ordering a new trial for the defendant because the prosecution used the dubious 
forensic technique of comparative bullet lead analysis). 
19 See The Innocence Project, DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT (Feb. 7, 2007), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Exon 
erations_Nationwide.php#. 
20 Ex Parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 469–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Cochran, 
J., dissenting). 
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weight to ‘scientific’ evidence when presented by ‘experts’ with 
impressive credentials.”21  A 1987 survey of recently discharged 
jurors serving on criminal cases exposed that forensic experts are 
the most persuasive trial witnesses.22  Moreover, approximately 
one-quarter of these jurors indicated that they would have 
instead come to a not guilty verdict had no scientific evidence 
been presented.23  The research resulted in a finding that “the 
[mere] presence of forensic science evidence, regardless of the 
certainty with which it connects the defendant with the crime, is 
predicted to result in higher rates of conviction.”24 
The effect of forensic science on jurors has been amplified by 
what legal scholars have referred to as the “CSI-Effect”25—the 
idea that jurors confuse the romanticized portrayal of the 
capabilities of forensic science on television with the actual 
capabilities of forensic science in the current criminal justice 
system.26  Prosecutors believe that jurors have become spoiled as 
a result of these forensic television shows and now unrealistically 
expect conclusive scientific proof of guilt before they convict.27  
However, once this expectation has been satisfied, these same 
jurors, as a result of these same forensic television shows, often 
place too much weight on the forensic evidence, resulting in 
convictions in cases where defendants probably should have been 
acquitted.28  This has come to be known as the “Reverse  
CSI-Effect,”29 and it may be more damaging to the criminal 
 
21 Clemons v. State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1064 n.6 (Md. 2006) (quoting Reed v. State, 
391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md. 1978)). 
22 Tara Marie La Morte, Sleeping Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and 
the Unreliability of Forensic Fingerprinting Evidence Under Daubert, 14 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 171, 208 (2003). 
23 Id. at 208–09. 
24 Id. at 209. 
25 The “CSI-Effect” refers to the theory that the popularity of shows like CSI has 
spoiled jurors, and that they now unrealistically expect conclusive scientific proof of 
guilt before they convict. Mark A. Godsey & Marie Alou, She Blinded Me With 
Science: Wrongful Convictions and the “Reverse CSI-Effect,” 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 481, 481–82 (2011). 
26 Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: 
Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2009). 
27 Godsey & Alou, supra note 25, at 481. 
28 Id. at 483. 
29 The “Reverse CSI-Effect” refers to the theory that jurors, as a result of  
CSI-type shows, often place too much weight on forensic evidence to the defendant’s 
unfair detriment in cases where forensic evidence is in fact produced by the 
prosecution. Id. 
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justice system and the interest of justice than the CSI-Effect.30  
One empirical study found forensic science errors in sixty-three 
percent of all cases resulting in wrongful convictions.31  By 
proffering scientific evidence, the State makes a special claim on 
a jury’s trust because the scientific evidence offers a truth that 
lay jurors cannot themselves draw from a set of facts. 
The serious threat created by the “Reverse CSI-Effect” is 
exemplified in several cases.  In State v. Krone,32 a criminal 
defendant was convicted of murder almost exclusively on the 
basis of evidence offered by a forensic odontologist.33  The expert 
conclusively testified that bite marks on the victim’s body 
matched the defendant’s bite pattern.34  In fact, the expert’s 
testimony was so convincing that the defendant was nicknamed 
“the snaggletooth killer” by the press, and the jury found the 
defendant guilty.35  However, Krone was completely exonerated 
in 2002 after subsequent DNA testing revealed that the expert 
testimony was simply wrong.36 
The criminal justice system’s increasing dependence on 
scientific evidence has produced a long and troubling line of 
cases.  These cases struggle with the problem of how to rectify 
convictions premised upon expert testimony and scientific 
evidence subsequently proven to be legally and scientifically 
inaccurate or unreliable.  The reliability of such evidence will 
continue to face challenges and impugn existing—even 
longstanding—convictions as new scientific discoveries and 
revised methodologies improve the accuracy of forensic 
testimony.  Specifically, the cases that have addressed this issue 
fall into three categories: (1) when an expert witness withdraws 
earlier opinions offered at trial because of mistake or inaccuracy; 
(2) where newly available evidence undermines expert testimony 
from trial; and (3) when an expert willfully testifies falsely. 
 
30 Id. 
31 Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys, 
49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 424 (2001). 
32 897 P.2d 621 (Ariz. 1995). 
33 Id. at 622. 
34 Id. 
35 See Flynn McRoberts, Bite-Mark Verdict Faces New Scrutiny; Release of Other 
Death Row Inmate Prompts Arizona to Order DNA Tests, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 2004, 
at 1; see Krone, 897 P.2d at 622. 
36 See McRoberts, supra note 35. 
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This Note analyzes how the mandates of due process 
influence the standard courts should apply in granting 
postconviction relief to petitioners who were convicted based 
upon scientific evidence that is later proven to be unreliable, yet 
whose unreliability does not warrant full exoneration. 
This Note argues that due process requires a new trial when 
scientific evidence necessary to the conviction becomes so 
unreliable as to call the validity of the jury’s verdict into 
question.  Part I of this Note discusses how scientific evidence is 
admitted, the procedure for a convicted defendant’s 
postconviction relief once that evidence is deemed unreliable, and 
the constitutional protections that a convicted defendant is 
afforded under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Part II of this Note examines the divide among 
appellate courts as to whether the Due Process Clause requires a 
new trial when a conviction is based on evidence that has later 
been shown to be unreliable.  Part III of this Note argues that 
due process requires a new trial when scientific evidence in the 
original trial is shown to be sufficiently unreliable as to 
compromise confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the jury 
verdict.  A conviction later found to be based upon unreliable 
scientific evidence deprives the defendant of a fundamentally fair 
trial and thereby violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, under both procedural and substantive 
due process theories, because it raises an intolerable risk of an 
inaccurate verdict and undermines the integrity of the criminal 
justice system.  Because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act impedes the rights of a petitioner to assert his or her 
fundamental right to a fair trial, this Note argues that the 
statute, as currently written and applied, should be found 
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny review.  A new trial will 
ensure that innocent defendants do not fall victim to the inherent 
shortcomings of the scientific evidence juries so readily embrace. 
I. OVERVIEW 
This Part begins by examining various legal procedures to 
define what federal courts find to be scientific knowledge and 
provides a brief historical account of the standard to evaluate the 
reliability and admissibility of the scientific theory and 
technique.  Next, it provides an overview of postconviction relief 
procedures available to convicted defendants.  Finally, it provides 
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a background of the constitutional protections afforded to 
convicted defendants under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the trial 
court has a gatekeeping obligation to determine whether the 
explanative theory underlying every expert witness’s testimony, 
regardless of whether based on scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge, is “reliable.”37  To reflect this, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to require that the trial 
judge, before permitting an expert to testify, determine that 
“[(1)] the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; [(2)] the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
[(3)] the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to 
the facts of the case.”38  This Section examines the historical 
development of the law governing the use of scientific evidence. 
1. The Frye General Acceptance Test 
 Commencing in the nineteenth century and lasting until the 
start of the twentieth century, “the general standard for 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony rested on the 
assumption that experts had superior knowledge and training.”39  
Courts accredited this capability to experts due to their 
qualifications and success in their respective fields.40  Despite 
there being no glaring problems with this standard, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Frye v. United States,41 
pronounced a test for determining the admissibility of scientific 
evidence.42 
In Frye, the court stated that the trial judge must determine 
whether the scientific evidence at issue had “gained general 
acceptance in [its] particular field” to justify admitting the 
 
37 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151–52 (1999); see also Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
38 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
39 Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the Downs, 
the Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the “Gatekeeper” Function to 
Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho's Expansion of Daubert, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 689, 694 (2001). 
40 Id. at 694–95. 
41 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
42 Morsek, supra note 39, at 695. 
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evidence.43  This standard required judges to discern which 
scientific principles had achieved sufficient recognition and 
which scientific principles had not.44  To facilitate this endeavor, 
the court developed what is known as the “general acceptance” 
test,45 which requires a two-part analysis: (1) identifying the field 
in which the underlying principle falls,46 and (2) determining 
whether the proffered evidence is generally accepted in that 
field.47  The court articulated the general acceptance test as 
follows: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult 
to define.  Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force 
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a 
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which 
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.48 
This new analysis was “the first procedural barrier to the 
admission of scientific evidence and expert testimony.”49  Because 
this test excluded evidence not generally accepted in its 
particular field, it impeded the introduction of novel evidence 
that had not had time to gain acceptance in its respective field.50  
This inability to utilize new theories demonstrates the difficulties 
in devising the proper test for determining the admissibility of 
expert testimony.51 
 
 
43 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
44 Morsek, supra note 39, at 696. 
45 Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (1980). 
46 See People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 708, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (Sup. Ct. 
Kings Cnty. 1978) (“At the threshold of determining whether the technique meets 
the test of acceptance in the scientific community, is the question of defining that 
community.”); see also Giannelli, supra note 45, at 1208–10. 
47 See Giannelli, supra note 45, at 1210–11. 
48 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
49 Morsek, supra note 39, at 698. 
50 Id. at 699. 
51 Id. at 699–700. 
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2. The Federal Rules of Evidence 
In 1975, the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
presented an opportunity to illuminate the contention 
surrounding the admissibility of scientific evidence.52  Under the 
Federal Rules, however, the basic relevancy standard in Rule 702 
came into conflict with the general acceptance standard of Frye.53  
Although most federal courts followed the Frye standard prior to 
the adoption of the Federal Rules, the Rules were silent as to 
whether the general acceptance test had been superseded.54 
Those who believe that the Frye test should still apply after 
the Federal Rules were enacted found some support in the 
legislative history.55  They claimed that, because Frye was the 
established rule and no statement repudiating Frye appeared in 
the legislative history, the general acceptance standard remained 
intact.56 
Proponents of repealing the Frye standard emphasized the 
text of the Federal Rules.  They claimed that, “[b]ecause scientific 
evidence could be shown to be reliable and thus relevant under 
Rule 401 without regard to its general acceptance in the scientific 
community, and because none of the exclusions enumerated in 
Rule 402 [were] applicable, the Federal Rules have provided a 
standard of admissibility inconsistent with Frye.”57 
In the early 1990s, legal scholars began to question the 
standard of admissibility for scientific evidence because of these 
differences of opinion.58  In response to the inconsistencies, the 
United States Supreme Court ultimately pronounced a formal 
standard for admitting expert evidence.59 
 
52 Kaushal B. Majmudar, Daubert v. Merrell Dow: A Flexible Approach to the 
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 187, 198 (1993). 
53 Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-
Daubert World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251, 273 (1997). 
54 Giannelli, supra note 45, at 1229. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1230. 
58 Carrie C. Coppage, Note, The Revolution of the Admissibility of Scientific 
Evidence with Print Identification Evidence as a Model, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 609, 
612 (2001). 
59 Morsek, supra note 39, at 703. 
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3. The Daubert Declaration 
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court, in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,60 declared that the Frye 
general acceptance test did not survive the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.61  Specifically, the Supreme Court 
imposed a new obligation that, with respect to the admission of  
scientific evidence, requires the trial judge under Rules 702 and 
104(a) to act as a gatekeeper in screening scientific evidence to 
ensure both relevancy and reliability.62 
The Court stated that although the Federal Rules of 
Evidence displaced Frye, the Rules themselves do not place limits 
on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence.63  
However, the fact that the judge must ensure that any and all 
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is both relevant and 
reliable contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects 
and theories about which an expert may testify.64  Accordingly, 
the court said: 
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the 
trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 
104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific 
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or 
determine a fact in issue.  This entails a preliminary 
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying 
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that 
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in 
issue.65 
While the Supreme Court did not articulate a “definitive 
checklist or test,” the justices did identify five non-exclusive 
factors to aid in determining the admissibility of scientific 
evidence: (1) whether the theory or scientific technique “can be 
(and has been) tested”; (2) whether it has been “subjected to peer 
review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of 
error”: (4) “the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique’s operation”; and (5) whether the 
principle was generally accepted in the relevant scientific 
 
60 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
61 See id. at 587 (“[T]he Frye [general acceptance] test was superseded by the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
62 See id. at 589–92. 
63 Id. at 589. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 592–93. 
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community.66  The Court stated that the analysis intended by 
Rule 702 is a “flexible one,” and “[i]ts overarching subject is the 
scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and 
reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed 
submission.”67  The focus of the Rule 702 analysis must be 
exclusively on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions 
they produce.68 
While Daubert did suggest that the trial judge take on a 
gatekeeping function to prevent “unreliable” evidence from being 
admitted, it was unclear whether such screening was to always 
be exercised, or if it applied only to “novel” scientific evidence.69  
Because of the ambiguity in Daubert, federal courts struggled 
with these questions each time they were presented with non-
scientific expert evidence.70 
4. The Kumho Tire Answer 
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court answered the 
questions left unresolved by Daubert in Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael.71  The Supreme Court held that the gatekeeping 
obligation articulated in Daubert should apply to both testimony 
based on “scientific” knowledge and testimony based on 
“technical” and “other specialized” knowledge.72  In exercising its 
“gatekeeping” function, the trial court may, on the condition that 
doing so will help determine if the testimony is reliable, consider 
one or more of the five specific factors listed in Daubert.73  Kumho 
instructs that the test of reliability is “flexible” and that 
“Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor 
exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.”74  Rather, the 
court must look for a reliable basis in the knowledge and 
experience of the relevant discipline and “the same level of 
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in 
the relevant field.”75 
 
66 Id. at 593–94. 
67 Id. at 594–95. 
68 Id. at 595. 
69 Coppage, supra note 58, at 614. 
70 Morsek, supra note 39, at 711–12. 
71 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
72 Id. at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
73 Id. at 149–52. 
74 Id. at 141. 
75 Id. at 152. 
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5. The 2000 Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
In 2000, Rule 702 was amended in response to the Daubert 
and Kumho Tire decisions.76  The rule now states that an expert 
may testify if “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data”;  
“the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods”; 
and “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods 
to the facts of the case.”77  Thus, the amendment affirms the trial 
court’s gatekeeping function and “provides some general 
[principles] that the trial court must use to assess the reliability 
and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.”78  Consistent with 
Kumho Tire, the amended Rule “provides that all types of expert 
testimony present questions of admissibility for the trial court.”79  
As a result, the admissibility of expert testimony is regulated by 
Rule 104(a), which places the burden of establishing the 
pertinent admissibility requirements by a preponderance of the 
evidence on the proponent.80 
Furthermore, by not codifying the specific factors articulated 
in Daubert, the amendment allowed trial courts to determine 
which factors were pertinent to reliability in each case.81  
However, it is clear that the amendment was not intended to 
overrule Daubert because the Daubert factors are still pertinent 
to resolving the issues raised when the expert offers an opinion 
in an area of science. 
When convictions are based upon scientific evidence later 
shown to be unreliable, the foundations for the conclusions 
scientists made to help convict an individual have been 
undermined.  Had this new scientific knowledge been known to 
 
76 DAVID P. LEONARD ET. AL., EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 539 (2d ed. 
2008). 
77 FED. R. EVID. 702(b)–(d). 
78 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 LEONARD ET. AL., supra note 76. In fact, the Advisory Committee’s Note to 
Rule 702 lists other factors that courts have found “relevant in determining whether 
expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact,” 
including: (1) whether experts have developed their opinions naturally out of their 
own research independent of litigation, or have done so expressly for purposes of 
testifying, (2) whether there is too big of an analytical gap between the data and the 
opinion offered, (3) whether the expert has considered all relevant variables, 
(4) whether the expert brings the same rigor to the courtroom as he would in his 
regular work, and “(5) whether the field of expertise . . . is known to reach reliable 
results.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
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the trial court, it is unlikely that the expert testimony would 
have been admitted into evidence at trial.  Because the jury 
should have never seen the evidence they based the conviction 
on, postconviction remedies must be available to the convicted 
defendant. 
B. Postconviction Remedy Procedure 
A judgment of conviction rendered at the end of a criminal 
trial does not necessarily dispose of the case.  Not only do 
American jurisdictions permit recourse to direct review of 
convictions for most offenses, but they all also permit the 
defendant to attack his conviction through postconviction 
remedies.82  Generally, “[d]irect appeals [] can be made on the 
basis of ‘any nonharmless legal error,’ whereas postconviction 
appeals are typically allowed only on the basis of more egregious 
(such as constitutional or jurisdictional) error.”83 
Federal prisoners have had postconviction relief available to 
them since the Judiciary Act granted federal courts the authority 
to issue writs of habeas corpus.84  However, habeas relief was 
limited to only federal prisoners under the Act,85 and even though 
the Act did not announce the substantive scope of the writ, courts 
understood it to apply to jurisdictional challenges.86  Under the 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,87 Congress broadened the 
implementation of habeas corpus to include state prisoners,88 but 
courts continued to look upon the writ as a mere jurisdictional 
tool.89  But in the 1930s and 1940s, “courts began to expand the 
scope of habeas corpus to permit challenges to nonjurisdictional 
flaws such as violations of due process, the right to counsel, and 
other constitutional rights.”90  Both direct appeals and 
postconviction appeals should be available to defendants 
convicted based upon scientific evidence that has later been 
found to be unreliable. 
 
82 Note, State Post-Conviction Remedies, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 681 (1961). 
83 Terrell J. Iandiorio, Note, Federal Postconviction Relief and 28 USC § 2255(4): 
Are State Court Decisions “Facts”?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (2004). 
84 Id. at 1143–44; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. 
85 See § 14, 1 Stat. at 82. 
86 Iandiorio, supra note 83, at 1144. 
87 ch. 27, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. 
88 § 1, 14 Stat. at 386. 
89 Iandiorio, supra note 83, at 1144. 
90 Id. 
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1. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”) was adopted.91  Congress enacted the AEDPA to 
modify the pre-existing habeas process.92  Although the AEDPA 
was created for many different reasons, its paramount purpose 
was to decrease the death penalty process so that inmates could 
be put to death in a more timely manner.93 
One significant change under the AEDPA has affected the 
rule demanding that a state prisoner exhaust all state remedies 
before seeking federal review.94  This rule has been modified in 
two respects: (1) “the federal courts are now authorized to deny a 
petition on the merits even though the issues have not been 
exhausted,” and (2) “the federal courts are not permitted to infer 
state waiver of the exhaustion requirement from lack of response, 
although the state may still affirmatively waive the 
requirement.”95 
Under the language of the AEDPA, relief may be granted 
only if state court adjudication of the issues “resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States.”96  Factual 
determinations made by state courts continue to be presumed 
correct and under the Act may now be rebutted only by “clear 
and convincing evidence.”97 
Federal habeas corpus is not an ordinary remedy, and by no 
means should it be used to re-litigate state criminal dispositions 
on a regular basis.98  State courts’ findings of fact and legal 
conclusions have been given great deference under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d).99  However, the AEDPA was enacted to provide 
 
91 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(2012). 
92 Kenneth Williams, Why It Is so Difficult to Prove Innocence in Capital Cases, 
42 TULSA L. REV. 241, 246 (2006). 
93 Id. 
94 F. Martin Tieber, Federal Habeas Corpus Law and Practice—The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 77 MICH. B.J. 50, 51–52 
(1998). 
95 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)–(3) (2012); Tieber, supra note 94, at 52. 
96 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
97 § 2254(e)(1). 
98 Tieber, supra note 94, at 52. 
99 Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997) (stating that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d) dictates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings”). 
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limitations on state courts.100  Therefore, by limiting the 
procedural and substantive scope of the writ of habeas corpus, 
the AEDPA has made it even more challenging for potentially 
innocent inmates to obtain justice.101 
C. Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that minimally fair due process must be provided to 
those deprived by the government of life, liberty, or property, as 
long as the amount of process sought does not outweigh the 
associated costs, risk of error, and adverse impact on the 
government.102  The theory of due process is not intended to be a 
“technical conception with a fixed content.”103  Instead, it is 
meant to be flexible104 and “adaptable to the exigencies of a 
particular factual context.”105 
Convictions secured using false and unreliable evidence, 
even scientific evidence, do not automatically give rise to a 
challenge under the Due Process Clause.  Instead, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that, in most situations, other core 
constitutional protections suffice to protect a defendant against a 
conviction secured through such evidence by providing a real and 
meaningful opportunity to expose the flaws in the evidence in 
question.106  The Court has stated the following: 
The Constitution, our decisions indicate, protects a defendant 
against a conviction based on evidence of questionable 
reliability, not by prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but 
by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury that the 
evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit.  
 
100 Tieber, supra note 94, at 52. 
101 Williams, supra note 92, at 248. 
102 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 
(1976). 
103 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union Local 
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)); see Melissa Duncan, Finding a 
Constitutional Right to Access DNA Evidence: Postconviction, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 519, 
538 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
104 McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (“It is axiomatic that 
due process ‘is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.’ ”)); see Duncan, supra note 103. 
105 Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 243 (D. Mass. 2006); see Duncan, supra 
note 103. 
106 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2012). 
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Constitutional safeguards available to defendants to counter the 
State’s evidence include the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel; 
compulsory process; and confrontation plus cross-examination of 
witnesses.107 
These protections generally suffice to adequately protect a 
defendant and, therefore, obviate the need for further court 
intervention.  When marshaled effectively, they ensure that the 
jury is provided with, and can fully consider, the flaws and 
potential errors in the challenged evidence.108 
The Court in Perry v. New Hampshire109 recognized, 
however, that circumstances exist in which these safeguards may 
prove inadequate, requiring intervention by the courts.110  The 
Seventh Circuit has stated: 
Our Constitution protects against conviction[s] based on 
evidence of questionable reliability.  Despite the importance of 
this right, the admission of evidence rarely implicates due 
process.  Rather, courts typically rely on other means to ensure 
reliable evidence—state and federal rules, as well as different 
constitutional guarantees, such as the Sixth Amendment rights 
to counsel and confrontation.  Yet, when evidence is so 
extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental 
conceptions of justice, due process, like the sleeping giant, 
awakens.  In those situations, other protections have proven 
insufficient, and courts must step in to prevent injustice.111 
While the interest in fundamental fairness is an essential 
step in a due process analysis, the Court has found that “[d]ue 
[p]rocess does not require that every conceivable step be taken, 
irrespective of cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an 
innocent person.”112  However, due process does serve to protect 
against baseless deprivations of liberty at the hands of 
government officials by “barring certain government actions 
 
107 Id. (citations omitted). 
108 Id. at 729 (noting that defense counsel cautioned the jury during both 
opening and closing arguments regarding the potential errors in the challenged 
evidence and explored these potential errors and flaws during cross-examination). 
109 132 S. Ct. 716. 
110 See id. at 723 (“Only when evidence ‘is so extremely unfair that its admission 
violates fundamental conceptions of justice,’ have we imposed a constraint tied to the 
Due Process Clause.”) (citations omitted). 
111 United States v. Sanders, 708 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 723) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
112 Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 246 (D. Mass. 2006) (quoting Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 
them.”113  The standards of fundamental fairness “legitimately 
draw[] upon the principles that underlay the [established] 
categories of procedural and substantive due process.”114 
1. Procedural Due Process 
Procedural due process requires that the government may 
not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property unless 
fundamentally fair and free from arbitrariness.115  This 
requirement of fundamental fairness “prohibits the State from 
depriving its citizens of liberty in a criminal trial unless it first 
observes certain procedural safeguards.”116  Failure to comply 
with clearly delineated procedures will result in a “deprivation of 
liberty without due process of law.”117 
To declare a violation of procedural due process, a person 
seeking relief must first demonstrate that he retains a life, 
liberty, or property interest in the right the government seeks to 
eliminate.118  A court must then balance certain factors to 
determine if there has been a violation of procedural due 
process.119  In Matthews v. Eldridge,120 the Court articulated a 
balancing test to determine whether the government’s actions 
deprived a person of a life, liberty, or property interest without 
due process of law.121  The test requires a balancing of the 
following factors in order to determine whether procedural due 
process requires constitutional safeguards: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and  
 
 
113 Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998) (quoting Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114 See Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 311 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., 
concurring); see also Duncan, supra note 103. 
115 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976); see Duncan, supra 
note 103. 
116 Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 677 (4th Cir. 2000) (Murnaghan, J., 
dissenting). 
117 Id.; see Duncan, supra note 103, at 538–39. 
118 See McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
119 See Duncan, supra note 103, at 539. 
120 424 U.S. 319. 
121 Id. at 334–35. 
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finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.122 
2. Substantive Due Process 
The Court has stated that prisoners lawfully deprived of 
their freedom retain substantive liberty interests under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.123  Furthermore, “[s]ubstantive due 
process protects against deprivations of liberty where the state 
has no sufficient interest to justify the deprivation, regardless of 
the process that might be employed.”124  The primary function of 
substantive due process is to protect individuals from practices 
that are “contrary to contemporary standards of decency,” 
“shocking to the conscience,” or contrary to a “principle of justice 
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”125 
There are two primary features of judicial review in the 
realm of substantive due process analysis: (1) identification of a 
fundamental right or liberty interest that is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,”126 and (2) “a careful description of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest,” using the first prong as a 
guidepost.127  These requirements emphasize the level of care 
necessary in “defining the interests at stake in substantive due 
process analysis because, in determining a statute’s 
constitutionality, the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied 
depends on the nature and quality of the activity that the statute 
seeks to address.”128 
 
122 Id. at 335. 
123 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (“The mere fact that 
[petitioner] has been committed under proper procedures does not deprive him of all 
substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
124 Michael Avery, Paying for Silence: The Liability of Police Officers Under 
Section 1983 for Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 24 (2003). 
125 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165, 172 (1952). 
126 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 Id. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
128 Craig M. Jacobs, The Constitutionality of Collateral Post-Conviction Claims 
of Actual Innocence, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 455, 477–78 (2011); see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
at 722. 
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If an act of Congress infringes upon a liberty interest deemed 
fundamental, the appropriate level of review is strict scrutiny; if 
the act infringes upon a lesser liberty interest, then rational 
basis scrutiny generally applies.129  When a statute or 
government action infringes upon a right that does not rise to the 
fundamental level but is in some way constitutionally suspect, 
the court applies intermediate level scrutiny.130  Thus, 
substantive due process analysis requires identifying the nature 
of the liberty interest asserted to determine the appropriate level 
of judicial review. 
Both federal and state courts disagree as to whether the Due 
Process Clause requires a new trial when a conviction is based 
upon science later shown to be unreliable.  In particular, 
appellate courts are divided as to whether, in order to obtain a 
new trial, it suffices that the tainted expert testimony likely 
affected the trial’s outcome or whether a convicted defendant 
must affirmatively disprove the expert’s opinion.  In order to 
decide the appropriate standard, each must be analyzed under 
both substantive and procedural due process. 
II. THE DIVERGENT STANDARDS AMONG APPELLATE COURTS IN 
AFFORDING A CONVICTED DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL WHEN A 
CONVICTION IS BASED ON UNRELIABLE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE  
Notwithstanding the growing use of scientific evidence in 
criminal cases and the influence that such evidence has on the 
outcome of a trial, appellate courts lack uniformity in 
approaching wrongful conviction claims based on the use of false 
or unreliable scientific evidence.  This Part discusses the division 
among appellate courts as to whether, in order to obtain a new 
trial, it suffices that the tainted expert testimony likely affected 
the trial’s outcome or whether a convicted defendant must 
affirmatively disprove the expert’s conclusion.  Section A 
discusses the reasonable probability standard—that courts are 
willing to grant relief when scientific evidence in the original 
trial is shown to be sufficiently unreliable as to undermine 
confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the jury verdict.  
Section B discusses the actual innocence standard—that courts 
 
129 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593–94 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (discussing when the strict scrutiny test applies and when the rational 
basis test applies). 
130 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1997). 
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require a defendant who challenges scientific evidence as 
unreliable to proffer additional, exculpatory evidence that 
affirmatively demonstrates that the expert testimony was 
actually false, or that the defendant was innocent of the crime. 
A. The Reasonable Probability Standard 
Some appellate courts that have heard wrongful conviction 
claims based on the use of scientific evidence that was later 
found to be fundamentally unreliable have taken a less 
restrictive approach than others.  These courts are willing to 
grant relief when scientific evidence in the original trial is shown 
to be sufficiently unreliable as to undermine confidence in the 
accuracy and integrity of the jury verdict.131 
For example, in Han Tak Lee v. Glunt,132 the defendant was 
convicted of first degree murder and arson, and sentenced to life 
without the possibility of parole after his twenty-year-old 
mentally ill daughter died in a cabin fire.133  The defendant 
sought federal habeas relief claiming that advances in the field of 
arson science demonstrated that the expert testimony offered 
against him at his original trial was fundamentally unreliable.134  
The district court denied the petition after concluding “claims of 
actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence are never 
grounds for federal habeas relief absent an independent 
constitutional violation.”135  On appeal, the Third Circuit 
reversed the holding that the defendant was entitled to discovery 
and an opportunity to present his newfound evidence at an 
evidentiary hearing in order to ascertain whether the original 
trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by use of the unreliable 
expert testimony.136  The court concluded that “[i]f [the 
defendant’s] expert’s independent analysis of the fire scene 
 
131 See, e.g., Han Tak Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403–04 (3d Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Freeman, 650 F.3d 673, 678–80 (7th Cir. 2011); Drake v. L.A. Portuondo, 
553 F.3d 230, 233 (2d Cir. 2009); State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590, 598–99 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2008); State v. Krone, 897 P.2d 621, 621 (Ariz. 1995); State v. Gookins, 637 
A.2d 1255, 1259 (N.J. 1994); In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 
Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 504 (W. Va. 1993); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 
587 (Minn. 1982). 
132 667 F.3d 397. 
133 Id. at 400. 
134 Id. at 402. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 403–04. 
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evidence—applying principles from new developments in fire 
science—shows that the fire expert testimony at [the defendant’s] 
trial was fundamentally unreliable, then [the defendant] will be 
entitled to federal habeas relief on his due process claim.”137 
In United States v. Freeman,138 four defendants were 
convicted of various drug crimes.139  However, the district court 
ultimately decided that “the government’s star witness had 
testified falsely, that the government knew this testimony was 
false, and that the government relied upon it to secure the 
defendants’ convictions.”140  The Seventh Circuit held that, before 
granting a new trial on due process grounds, it need not “be 
conclusively established that the . . . witness was lying.”141  In 
fact, the court squarely rejected the suggestion that a defendant 
must prove that the challenged evidence was verifiably false in 
order to trigger due process relief.142  The Seventh Circuit 
explained that there “does not need to be conclusive proof that 
the testimony was false” for the testimony to constitute a due 
process violation.143 
In Drake v. Portuondo,144 the prosecution offered the 
testimony of a prison psychologist to establish that the defendant 
had the requisite intent to commit murder.145  The expert 
testified that the facts of the case led him to conclude that the 
defendant suffered from picquerism—“a purported 
syndrome . . . in which the perpetrator realizes sexual 
satisfaction from penetrating a victim by sniper activity or by 
stab or bite wounds,” and the jury convicted the defendant on two 
counts of second degree murder.146  In a habeas petition, the 
convicted defendant established that the expert had lied on the 
stand regarding his credentials, when he learned about the facts 
of the case, and how and when he concluded that the defendant 
suffered from picquerism.147  The court determined that the 
 
137 Id. at 407–08. 
138 650 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2011). 
139 See id. at 675. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 679–80. 
142 See id. 
143 Id. at 680. 
144 553 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2009). 
145 See id. at 236. 
146 Id. at 235, 237. 
147 Id. at 237–39. 
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expert’s conclusions were not based on reliable science, that the 
prosecutor knew that at least some of the expert’s testimony was 
false, and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial.148  The 
court did not, however, require the defendant to disprove the 
expert’s conclusions regarding picquerism or to prove that the 
defendant lacked the requisite intent for the crime. 
In State v. Edmunds,149 the defendant was convicted of 
reckless homicide of an infant after expert medical testimony at 
trial suggested the infant’s injuries could only be explained by 
shaken baby syndrome.150  During postconviction proceedings, 
Edmunds presented expert testimony from multiple doctors 
revealing a newly developed debate in the medical community 
that undermined the testimony of the state’s expert trial 
witness.151  Although it found that “the new evidence d[id] not 
completely dispel the old evidence,” the court nonetheless found 
that a new trial was warranted because “the record establishes 
that there is a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both 
the new medical testimony and the old medical testimony, would 
have a reasonable doubt as to Edmunds’s guilt.”152 
In In re Investigation of the West Virginia State Police Crime 
Laboratory, Serology Division,153 the West Virginia court 
appointed a circuit judge to conduct an investigation into 
whether habeas relief should be granted to prisoners whose 
convictions were obtained through the testimony of a former 
serologist who was alleged to have engaged in systematic 
misconduct, including the falsification of evidence in criminal 
prosecutions.154  The investigation concluded that the serologist’s 
“pattern and practice of misconduct completely undermined the 
validity and reliability of any forensic work he performed or 
reported . . . .”155  Although the report did not disprove the 
serologist’s conclusion in every trial in which his testimony was 
offered, the court held that all of his testimony should be deemed 
false, and thus “in any habeas corpus hearing involving [the 
serologist’s] evidence, the only issue is whether the evidence 
 
148 Id. at 243–44, 247–48. 
149 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). 
150 Id. at 592–93. 
151 Id. at 593. 
152 Id. at 599. 
153 438 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993). 
154 Id. at 502–03. 
155 Id. at 504. 
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presented at trial, independent of the forensic evidence presented 
by [the serologist], would have been sufficient to support the 
verdict.”156  Therefore, the court held that due process required a 
new trial for defendants who were convicted based on the 
serologist’s evidence if such evidence “could . . . in any reasonable 
likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury . . . .”157 
Finally, in State v. Gookins,158 three defendants arrested for 
drunk driving declared they were innocent but pleaded guilty 
when they were presented with breathalyzer  
blood-alcohol-concentration readings in excess of .10 percent.159  
After their pleas, an undercover operation resulted in the 
conviction of the arresting officer on charges of falsifying the 
results of a breathalyzer test on an undercover agent.160  The 
three defendants moved for new trials based on the officer’s 
conviction, but the Municipal Court denied the motions.161  The 
Law Division and the Appellate Division of New Jersey upheld 
the Municipal Court’s decision because the charges against the 
arresting officer did not relate to the tests performed on the three 
defendants who pleaded guilty, and thus did not establish 
falsification of evidence in any of their cases.162  The three 
defendants were unable to prove that the officer falsified the 
results in their own cases and that they were actually innocent.  
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed that decision and 
remanded the cases to the municipal court where the State would 
be required “to prove defendants’ guilt with evidence that is free 
of the taint of [the officer’s] pattern of misconduct.”163 
These courts hold that due process can be violated by the use 
of testimony or evidence whose validity has been seriously called 
into question, even where it has not necessarily been recanted or 
wholly discredited.  In doing so, these courts equate “false” 
evidence with unreliable or discredited evidence.  Thus, under 
the reasonable probability standard, a convicted defendant 
should be granted relief when he can show that scientific  
 
 
156 Id. at 506. 
157 Id. at 505 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)). 
158 637 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1994). 
159 Id. at 1256. 
160 Id. at 1257. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1260. 
FINAL_IANNECE 10/7/2015 7:11 PM 
2015] DUE PROCESS AND POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 219 
evidence in the original has later been shown to be sufficiently 
unreliable as to undermine confidence in the accuracy and 
integrity of the jury verdict. 
B. Actual Innocence Standard 
The actual innocence standard that other appellate courts 
have adopted requires a defendant who challenges scientific 
evidence as unreliable to proffer additional, exculpatory evidence 
to affirmatively demonstrate that the expert testimony was 
actually false, or to demonstrate his or her actual innocence of 
the crime.164  These courts hold that due process is not violated 
merely because an individual is convicted using evidence or 
testimony that was later found to be unreliable and thus misled 
the jury into reaching a guilty verdict. 
For example, in United States v. Berry,165 the petitioner 
claimed that his due process rights were violated because his 
conviction was based largely on expert testimony that had been 
subsequently found to be unreliable.166  The petitioner had 
originally been convicted, in part, on the basis of “compositional 
analysis of bullet lead” evidence.167  Following the petitioner’s 
conviction, the FBI discontinued the use of compositional 
analysis of bullet lead evidence because it was determined to be 
inaccurate.168  Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the 
expert testimony suffered from “significant criticisms,” the court 
denied relief because the petitioner failed to show that the 
evidence was “almost entirely unreliable.”169 
In Fuller v. Johnson,170 a defendant was sentenced to death 
for robbery, murder, and sexual assault.171  The defendant 
initially confessed that he committed the crimes alone, but at 
trial, he recanted his confession and posited that an accomplice 
 
164 See United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010); Byrd v. 
Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2000); Fuller v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 496–
97 (5th Cir. 1997); Ex Parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 458–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2011); Trotter v. State, 736 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
165 624 F.3d 1031. 
166 Id. at 1039–40. 
167 Id. at 1035–36 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
168 See id. at 1037. 
169 Id. at 1041 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
170 114 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 1997). 
171 See id. at 494. 
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actually killed the victim with a pipe.172  To challenge the 
defendant’s allegations, the prosecution presented autopsy 
evidence from a medical professional showing that the victim’s 
injuries indicated she was killed with blows from a fist, not a 
pipe.173  Following his conviction, the defendant filed a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus arguing that his due process rights 
were violated because his conviction was based on false 
testimony.174  In support, the defendant submitted an affidavit 
from another medical professional who stated that the trial 
expert did not perform the scientific procedures necessary to 
make the conclusions presented to the jury.175  The district court 
denied the petition and the Fifth Circuit affirmed because the 
defendant did not show that the expert’s opinion was “actually 
false.”176 
Similarly, in Byrd v. Collins,177 the petitioner also claimed 
his due process rights were violated when he was convicted with 
allegedly false testimony.178  The petitioner had originally been 
convicted and sentenced to death for aggravated murder.179  In 
his federal application for a writ of habeas, the petitioner 
presented evidence to show that witnesses from his original trial 
were “involved in a scheme to testify falsely against [him] in 
order to further their own causes with the . . . [p]rosecutor’s 
[o]ffice.”180  However, the Sixth Circuit denied relief because the 
petitioner failed to show that the statements were “indisputably 
false” rather than merely misleading.181 
In Ex Parte Robbins,182 the petitioner was convicted of capital 
murder of his girlfriend’s seventeen-month-old child and was 
sentenced to imprisonment for life.183  The State’s case largely 
depended on the expert opinion of a medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy and who testified that the child died from 
“asphyxia due to compression of the chest and abdomen and that 
 
172 See id. at 495. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. at 496. 
176 Id. 
177 209 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2000). 
178 Id. at 500–01. 
179 See id. at 494. 
180 Id. at 500. 
181 Id. at 517–18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
182 360 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 
183 Id. at 448. 
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the manner of death was homicide.”184  More than eight years 
later, after the medical examiner had acquired “more experience 
in the field of forensic pathology,” she re-evaluated the evidence 
on which she had based her trial opinion and concluded that she 
had been wrong and that the cause and manner of death could 
not be determined.185  Furthermore, four other forensic 
pathologists also opined that, based on the trial evidence, the 
child’s death could not be affirmatively attributed to homicide.186  
The petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus 
arguing, among other things, that he was denied a right to a fair 
trial because his conviction was based on false testimony.187  As a 
result, the trial court recommended that the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals grant the petitioner a new trial because “his 
due process and due course of law rights were violated, as was 
his right to an impartial jury.”188 
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that 
due process did not require a new trial because the expert’s prior 
testimony had not “been proven to be false.”189  The court 
explained that the expert’s “trial testimony is not false just 
because her re-evaluation of the evidence has resulted in a 
different, ‘undetermined’ opinion, especially when neither she 
nor any other medical expert can exclude her original opinion as 
the possible cause and manner of death.”190  In other words, there 
was no due process violation because petitioner could not 
definitively prove that no crime had occurred. 
Finally, in Trotter v. State,191 a defendant was convicted of 
killing a police officer based on expert testimony that a .357 
magnum revolver was used to kill the officer.192  After the 
defendant was convicted, the same expert examined the deceased 
 
184 Id. at 450. 
185 Id. at 454. 
186 See id. at 454–55. 
187 Id. at 454. 
188 Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 457. See generally TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1876). 
The term “remedy by due course of law,” as used in the constitutional provision 
guaranteeing to every person a remedy by due course of law for injury done to him in 
person or property, means the “reparation for injury ordered by a tribunal having 
jurisdiction in due course of procedure after a fair hearing.” Noel v. Menninger 
Found., 267 P.2d 934, 943 (Kan. 1954). 
189 Id. at 461, 463. 
190 Id. at 461. 
191 736 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
192 See id. at 538. 
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officer’s own .38 caliber Smith & Wesson and determined that his 
expert trial testimony was wrong.193  Instead, he found that it 
was the officer’s own gun that was used to kill the officer, not the 
.357 magnum.194  The circuit court and the Missouri Court of 
Appeals denied the defendant’s request for a new trial because 
the expert’s testimony at trial, though later recanted, was true to 
the best of the expert’s knowledge at the time of the trial.195 
These courts hold that a new trial is not warranted unless 
the expert testimony can be shown to be actually false.  In doing 
so they place the burden on the convicted defendant to 
affirmatively prove that testimony at a given trial is technically 
“false” rather than simply factually wrong or unreliable.  Thus, 
under the actual innocence standard, a criminal defendant may 
receive a new trial only if he also proffers fully exonerating 
evidence. 
III. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL WHEN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO THE CONVICTION BECOMES SO 
UNRELIABLE AS TO CALL THE VALIDITY OF THE JURY’S VERDICT 
INTO QUESTION 
This Part argues that due process requires courts to grant 
postconviction relief when scientific evidence in the original trial 
is shown to be sufficiently unreliable as to undermine confidence 
in the accuracy and integrity of the jury verdict.  First, it protects 
the defendant’s due process right to a fundamentally fair trial by 
eliminating the risk of an inaccurate verdict.  Second, it keeps 
the burden of proof on the government.  Third, policy reasons 
dictate that the reasonable probability standard calls for 
postconviction relief.  Finally, convictions based upon unreliable 
evidence are analogous to other evidentiary errors that are 
entitled to due process postconviction relief. 
 
193 See id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 539. 
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A. The “Reasonable Probability Standard” Preserves the 
Integrity of the Criminal Justice System by Protecting the 
Defendant’s Right to a Fundamentally Fair Trial 
1. Procedural Due Process Rationale 
Limits on powerful claims that the accuracy and integrity of 
a jury verdict have been compromised are not only unjustifiable 
but also violate the fundamental premises of the Supreme 
Court’s own procedural due process jurisprudence.  Most clearly 
they violate the calculus in Matthews v. Eldridge for determining 
when due process requires a procedure to protect an interest in 
life, liberty, or property.196 
In Matthews, the court seeks to weigh any costs of an 
additional procedure against the expected value of said 
procedure.197  The value of the procedure is formulated by 
“multipl[ying] the importance of the interest at stake by the 
degree to which a particular procedure would increase the 
accuracy of determining whether the interest should be 
deprived.”198  This benefit should be weighed against the cost of 
providing the procedure.199  While one can usually question the 
value to be assigned to most interests, “no one doubts the value 
in not being executed or in not having to serve a lengthy prison 
sentence.”200 
When there is a reasonable probability that, had the jury not 
heard the unreliable scientific evidence, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different, it is plainly unjust to keep 
the prisoner incarcerated.  Furthermore, because there is a 
reasonable probability of the petition’s success, a prisoner’s 
liberty has value in excess of the costs associated with litigation 
and review of the unreliable scientific evidence.  Thus, under the 
concepts of fairness and efficiency, an additional procedure is 
both socially desirable and also likely required by the cost-benefit 
procedural due process test of Matthews. 
 
196 See supra Part I.C.1. 
197 George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, 
Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 293 (2003). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
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2. Substantive Due Process Rationale 
Substantive due process analysis requires identifying the 
nature of the liberty interest asserted in a claim of unreliable 
scientific evidence.  Petitioners claiming that their convictions 
were based upon scientific evidence later shown to be unreliable 
in their federal habeas petitions argue, at a basic level, that they 
were deprived of the fundamental right to a fair trial.  The right 
to a fair trial is “the most fundamental of all freedoms” and it 
must be maintained at all costs.201  The Supreme Court has 
described the right to a fair trial as deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition by stating, “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is 
a basic requirement of due process.”202  Therefore, if habeas 
petitioners can clearly establish that there is a reasonable 
probability that the result at trial would have been different had 
the jury known the scientific evidence was unreliable, they can 
demonstrate an infringement of their interest in being afforded a 
fair trial.  Given the importance and fundamental nature of this 
right, strict judicial review should apply to the AEDPA—the 
federal habeas corpus statute—insofar as it impedes a criminal 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
Due process is not a formula but rather a balancing of 
interests between the government’s interest in enforcing a 
statute and the individual’s interest in the exercise of 
fundamental liberties.203  “In order to sustain constitutionality, 
the more a statute restricts protected liberty interests, the more 
significant the governmental interest must be and the more 
narrowly tailored the statute must be.”204  The federal habeas 
statute should be held to a strict scrutiny standard to the degree 
it prohibits federal habeas courts from considering claims under 
the reasonable probability standard because what is being 
asserted is a fundamental liberty interest: the right to a fair 
trial.205  Under strict scrutiny review, a challenged statute must 
be “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling [government] 
 
201 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). 
202 Id. at 543 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
203 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765–68 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (illustrating that due process decisions strike a balance between 
individual liberties and society’s demands). 
204 Jacobs, supra note 128, at 480. 
205 See id. at 480–81. 
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interest,” and to the degree it fails to meet these requirements, 
the statute is an unconstitutional violation of substantive due 
process.206 
The government has important interests at stake when it 
seeks to limit the availability of federal habeas review.207  The 
Court has stated, “[f]ederal intrusions into state criminal trials 
frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders 
and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.”208  
When conviction results from what is believed to be a fair trial, 
the State has presumably satisfied the constitutional burden 
required to convict the defendant for the charged crime.209  
Nevertheless, “the matter is not settled for either the habeas 
petitioner who seeks to challenge his conviction[,] or the State 
which must respond to a convicted defendant’s claims for 
postconviction relief.”210  Because the petitioner has seemingly 
been granted all procedural safeguards available both at trial 
and during her appeals, the government has supplied significant 
process, and a substantial interest in limiting habeas review.211  
Yet, when it is later found that scientific evidence, from which 
the conviction was based, has been shown to be unreliable, the 
need to limit claims under the reasonable probability standard 
upon habeas review seems much less compelling. 
Even if these “governmental interests are compelling 
enough, the denial of such claims is still not narrowly tailored to 
achieve those interests” because the same objectives could be 
achieved by other means.212  For example, the statute “could 
require a finding of a lower court that the underlying conviction 
has been called into doubt.”213  This example would be “more 
narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in limiting the 
availability of habeas review while simultaneously 
acknowledging the constitutionality of a claim of” reasonable 
probability that the trial result would have been different had 
 
206 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993). 
207 Jacobs, supra note 128, at 481. 
208 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 263–65 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
209 Jacobs, supra note 128, at 482. 
210 Id. at 482–83. 
211 Id. at 483. 
212 Id. at 484. 
213 Id. 
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the jury known the scientific evidence was unreliable.214  
Therefore, to the extent that the AEDPA restricts petitioner’s 
right to assert his entitlement to a fair trial under this specific 
reasonable probability standard, “the statute should fail to 
muster constitutionality under strict scrutiny review.”215 
B. The Burden of Proof Throughout a Criminal Matter Should 
Remain with the Government 
The burden of proof in a criminal prosecution as to all 
essential elements of the crime rest upon the prosecution and the 
proofs must be such as to convince the trier of the fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt.216  If a petitioner were required to disprove an 
element of a crime, or prove his actual innocence, the burden of 
proof would be turned on its head.  The consequences of the 
State’s use of unreliable evidence should not fall on the shoulders 
of the petitioner.  Rather, having used misleading scientific 
evidence to convict, the State must bear the burden of retrying 
the petitioner in a manner that permits confidence in the 
conviction.  Furthermore, a petitioner would never be able to 
obtain a new trial where forensic science can neither support nor 
disprove the conclusion presented to the jury. 
C. Policy Dictates Postconviction Relief 
1. The Reasonable Probability Standard Takes into Account the 
Uniquely Persuasive Impact of Scientific Evidence in 
Criminal Trials 
Criminal convictions increasingly turn on the availability 
and strength of scientific evidence offered by the prosecution to 
establish that a crime has been committed and that the charged 
defendant is the only possible perpetrator.  Juries raised on 
television programs like CSI expect scientific evidence and, once 
that expectation is satisfied, give disproportionate—even 
dispositive—weight to that evidence.  Thus, once an expert has 
indicated that a crime has occurred, the jury likely focuses on 
whether it was the defendant who committed the crime instead 
of on whether a crime was committed at all.  However, if the 
 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 United States v. Carr, 550 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1977). 
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forensic evidence had been presented to the jury accurately, such 
evidence certainly would affect how the jury evaluated all of the 
evidence against a petitioner. 
The reasonable probability standard accounts for the 
possibility that juries may have given considerable weight to 
scientific evidence that has since been shown to be unreliable.  If 
convicted defendants can show that scientific evidence has been 
discredited so as to undermine confidence in the accuracy and 
integrity of the jury verdict, they should be granted relief.  
Because of the increasing availability and strength of scientific 
evidence offered in criminal prosecutions, this safeguard is 
necessary to protect the rights of criminal defendants. 
2. The Reasonable Probability Standard Recognizes That the 
Accuracy of the Result Is More Important than Finality of 
the Judgment 
Concerns over eroding a judgment’s finality are intrinsic to 
writs of habeas corpus because every writ granted undermines a 
previously final judgment.  In the rare instances where scientific 
experts revise their conclusion or where newly available evidence 
undermines expert testimony from trial, reopening a case that 
hinged on the expert’s testimony will help courts keep pace with 
science. 
Every opinion revised on habeas will present the court 
system with two more reviews of the scientific discipline at issue 
than otherwise would have occurred.  Appellate courts would 
inquire into whether change had occurred in the discipline at 
issue, and if a significant change had occurred, whether the 
Daubert test, when applied in the new trial resulting from 
habeas, would be informed by the appellate level decision.  In 
this light, the Daubert test would necessarily operate differently.  
Instead of a proforma application to scientific disciplines long 
established, it would be a fresh inquiry into the validity of the 
changes that occurred in the discipline.  Courts would no longer 
lag behind scientific development; rather they would keep pace 
with it by regularly exposing it to the rigors of the adversarial 
system. 
Providing a method that gives effect to the empirical process 
would encourage forensic practitioners to be driven by science’s 
rapid advancement, rather than act as if they were mere 
technicians.  Providing a methodology that recognizes 
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development in a scientific field would force practitioners to 
actively improve their skills and techniques rather than rely on 
outdated certifications and long years of practicing the same 
techniques.  Therefore, “[i]f a convicted defendant can produce 
sufficient indication that the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt was wrong, the institutional need for finality 
yields to the more compelling concerns of truth and fairness.”217  
This compromise should not threaten the criminal justice 
system’s responsibility to punish the guilty because “whatever 
the truth may be, whether the defendant be guilty or innocent, it 
can be established by another trial.”218  In fact, it has been 
expressed that while “[f]inality of judgment is essential in 
criminal cases, [] so is accuracy of the result—an accurate result 
that will stand the test of time and changes in scientific 
knowledge.”219 
D. Convictions Based upon Scientific Evidence Later Shown To 
Be Unreliable Are Analogous to Other Evidentiary Errors 
That Are Entitled to Due Process Postconviction Relief 
The Supreme Court has long been committed to the principle 
that due process forbids the government from obtaining a 
conviction through the use of false testimony.220  In fact, “[t]he 
development of due process protection against the use of false 
testimony has been intertwined with protection against non-
disclosure of exculpatory evidence.”221  Because scientific evidence 
later shown to be unreliable presents similar fairness problems 
to defendants, it should be afforded the same due process 
protection. 
 
217 Burr v. Florida, 474 U.S. 879, 881 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
218 Bussey v. State, 64 S.W. 268, 269 (Ark. 1901). 
219 Ex Parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Cochran, J., 
dissenting). 
220 See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945) (acknowledging that 
obtaining a conviction through knowing use of perjury violates due process); Hysler 
v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942) (finding that the prosecution’s complicity in 
obtaining a conviction through the use of perjured testimony violates due process); 
cf. New York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U.S. 688, 689 (1943) (remanding to 
state court to determine whether habeas corpus is available in light of changed law 
allowing the state court to set aside a conviction on a showing that a guilty plea was 
obtained by fraud where conviction had allegedly been procured through the use of 
perjured testimony knowingly used by the prosecution). 
221 Anne Bowen Poulin, Convictions Based on Lies: Defining Due Process 
Protection, 116 PENN ST. L. REV 331, 336 (2011). 
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In Mooney v. Holohan,222 the prisoner alleged that his 
conviction violated due process because the “prosecuting 
authorities” knowingly used perjured testimony, which was the 
basis for his conviction.223  The Court condemned the state’s 
corruption of the proceeding without considering the precise 
requirements for such a due process claim.224  In Brady v. 
Maryland,225 the Court granted the defendant a new capital 
sentencing hearing because the prosecution had not disclosed 
evidence favorable to the defendant bearing on sentencing, thus 
establishing that proof of false testimony was not essential to a 
due process violation.226  While Brady did not involve false 
testimony, the Court labeled its holding as an extension of 
Mooney.227  The Court emphasized that Mooney rested on the 
“avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused” and not on 
“punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor.”228 
While requiring some governmental knowledge, the Court 
has made it clear that the crux of the wrong is the unfairness of 
the proceeding, not the wrongdoing of the prosecutor.229  Thus, 
the Court has concluded that “false testimony or non-disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence violated . . . due process . . . even when 
the prosecutor did not have actual knowledge of the falsity.”230 
In Mesarosh v. United States,231 “the Court . . . condemned 
reliance on false testimony even though the prosecution had 
presented it unknowingly.”232  The Court held that “the dignity of 
the United States Government will not permit the conviction of 
 
222 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
223 Id. at 110. 
224 Id. at 112 (stating that due process cannot be satisfied “by mere notice and 
hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in 
truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate 
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured”). 
225 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
226 See id. at 84–87 (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecution”). 
227 Id. at 86. 
228 Id. at 87. 
229 See id. at 87–88. 
230 Poulin, supra note 221, at 338. 
231 352 U.S. 1 (1956). 
232 Poulin, supra note 221, at 338; Mesarosh, 352 U.S. at 14. 
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any person on tainted testimony.”233  Furthermore, in Giglio v. 
United States,234 the Court recognized that the government’s 
failure to correct false testimony could violate due process even 
though no one acting for the government actually knew the 
testimony was false.235  Like with false testimony, non-disclosure 
can violate due process even though the prosecutor was unaware 
of exculpatory evidence.236 
The Court has also recognized that any false or misleading 
testimony may corrupt the truth-finding process and render the 
trial unfair.237  The Court has made it clear that a defendant 
need not establish perjury to prevail in a false testimony case.238  
In Alcorta v. Texas,239 the Court granted relief because the 
witness conveyed a false impression even though the testimony 
was not clearly false.240  The misleading testimony strengthened 
the prosecution’s case, and a more truthful testimony would have 
corroborated the defendant’s claim and impeached the witness’s 
credibility.241  Similarly, in Napue v. Illinois,242 the Court granted 
relief based on false testimony relevant only to impeach the 
witness.243 
Analogously to false testimony and non-disclosure cases, 
cases tried on the basis of scientific evidence later shown to be 
unreliable convey false impressions to the jury and may corrupt 
the truth-finding process, rendering the trial fundamentally 
unfair.  Therefore, scientific evidence later shown to be 
unreliable should also be seen as “tainted testimony,” and the 
defendant should be protected under the Due Process Clause 
even when both the prosecution and the expert presents it 
unknowingly. 
 
233 Poulin, supra note 221, at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted); Mesarosh, 
352 U.S. at 9. 
234 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
235 Id. at 155. 
236 See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (granting the defendant 
relief on the basis of non-disclosure even though the prosecutor did not have all the 
exculpatory information until after trial). 
237 See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 265 (1959) (granting relief based on 
the prosecution’s failure to correct false testimony, which was relevant only to 
impeach the witness’s credibility). 
238 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957). 
239 355 U.S. 28. 
240 See id. at 30–31. 
241 Id. at 31–32. 
242 360 U.S. 264. 
243 Id. at 269–70. 
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In both the false testimony and the non-disclosure cases, one 
crucial question is whether the false testimony or the undisclosed 
exculpatory evidence is “material.”244  The Court has varied the 
definition of material depending on the nature of the defendant’s 
claim, holding that false testimony claims are subject to a lower 
materiality showing than non-disclosure claims.245  The Court 
introduced materiality into this line of cases in Brady, stating 
that suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution 
“violates due process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or to punishment.”246 
To support a non-disclosure claim, a defendant must 
establish a reasonable probability that the result would have 
been different had the exculpatory evidence been disclosed.247  In 
contrast, a defendant who demonstrates that false testimony was 
improperly used at trial is required only to show a reasonable 
likelihood that the falsity had an impact on the outcome.248  The 
Court equated the reasonable likelihood standard with the 
harmless error test.249 
The Court stated three reasons for employing a less 
demanding materiality standard in false testimony cases in 
United States v. Agurs.250  First, obtaining a conviction by the 
knowing use of perjury is fundamentally unfair.251  Second, false 
testimony cases involve prosecutorial misconduct.252  Third, the 
Court asserted that “more importantly . . . they involve a 
corruption of the truth-[finding]  . . . process.”253 
Applying the same standard, to establish a due process 
violation based on scientific evidence later shown to be 
unreliable, the defendant must show that unreliable scientific 
evidence was presented at trial, that the prosecution had the 
requisite culpability, and that the scientific evidence was 
material.  Convicted defendants have been able to show that 
 
244 Poulin, supra note 221, at 342. 
245 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681–82 (1985). 
246 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
247 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
248 Id. at 679 n.9. 
249 Id. at 679–80 (“[This rule] may . . . easily be stated as a materiality standard 
under which the fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure 
to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
250 427 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). 
251 Id. at 103. 
252 Id. at 103–04. 
253 Id. 
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unreliable scientific evidence was presented at trial when an 
expert witness withdraws earlier opinions offered at trial because 
of mistake or inaccuracy, where newly available evidence 
undermines expert testimony from trial, and when an expert 
willfully testifies falsely.254  If the prosecution does not have the 
requisite culpability—either through actual, constructive, or 
imputed knowledge—the unreliable evidence must be held to the 
higher materiality showing.  Therefore, if the defendant can 
establish a “reasonable probability” that the result would have 
been different had the jury known the scientific evidence was 
unreliable, she should be awarded postconviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Reliable scientific evidence can assist judges and juries in 
determining truth and advancing the proper, efficient, and fair 
administration of justice.  Unreliable scientific evidence, 
however, creates a great potential that the government will 
imprison the wrongfully accused.  The unreliability of evidence 
may be due to forensic fraud, examiner bias or error, invalid 
procedures, or well-established methodologies, the soundness of 
which is later disproven.  Whatever the cause, the result is the 
same:  A criminal defendant may be convicted based on 
unreliable evidence that should never have been admitted at 
trial, but whose unreliability was not known until after the 
defendant was convicted. 
Due process of law requires a new trial when scientific 
evidence necessary to convict becomes so unreliable as to call the 
validity of the jury’s verdict into question in order to ensure that 
innocent defendants do not fall victim to the inherent 
shortcomings of the scientific evidence juries so readily embrace.  
Courts should grant federal habeas petitioners relief under the 
Due Process Clause when they satisfy the “reasonable 
probability” standard for four reasons.  First, it will ensure 
protection of the petitioners’ procedural and substantive due 
process rights to a fundamentally fair trial.  Second, it will keep 
the burden of proving all elements of a crime on the government.  
Third, policy reasons dictate that the reasonable probability 
standard calls for postconviction relief.  Finally, convictions  
 
 
254 See supra Introduction. 
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based upon unreliable evidence are analogous to other 
evidentiary errors that are entitled to due process postconviction 
relief. 
 
